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I. Cartels and horizontal agreements
A. GC annuls decisions ordering ‘fishing
expeditions’
On 14 November 2012, the General Court (GC) issued
two important judgments regarding the extent of the
European Commission’s powers to dawn raid compan-
ies for suspected competition law infringements.1
The GC held that the European Commission must
precisely delimit the products concerned by a dawn
raid in the decision ordering the inspection, and went
on to annul the Commission’s inspection decisions in
both cases on the grounds that it considered that the
Commission did not have reasonable grounds to
launch inspections in relation to the broad category of
products set out in the decisions, but only in relation
to a sub-category of those products.
The GC noted that there is an obligation on the
European Commission to specify the subject-matter
and purpose of an inspection in its decision. The
reasons given for an inspection decision ‘need not ne-
cessarily delimit precisely the relevant market’, but the
Commission is required to state in the decision ‘the es-
sential characteristics of the suspected infringement, indi-
cating inter alia the market thought to be affected’.2 The
Commission must
identify the sectors covered by the alleged infringement with
which the investigation is concerned with a degree of preci-
sion sufficient to enable the undertaking in question to limit
its cooperation to its activities in the respect of which the
Commission has reasonable grounds for suspecting an in-
fringement of the competition rules, justifying interference in
the undertaking’s sphere of private activity, and to make it
possible for the Court of the European Union to determine, if
necessary, whether or not those grounds are sufficiently rea-
sonable for those purposes.3
The GC ruled that by referring in the inspection deci-
sions to all electric cables and all material associated
with those cables, the Commission had met its obliga-
tion to define the subject matter of its investigation.
However, the GC then reviewed whether the Commis-
sion had reasonable grounds to issue the inspection deci-
sions in question—in light of their very broad scope. The
GC closely reviewed the actual evidence which the Com-
mission had at its disposal before the adoption of the in-
spection decisions, including evidence from a leniency
application. It also considered the Commission’s press
release of 3 February 2009, as well as the identity of the
employees in whom the inspectors took an interest during
the inspection. On the basis of this evidence, the GC con-
cluded that the Commission had not demonstrated that
it had reasonable grounds for ordering inspections relat-
ing to all electrical cables and all material associated with
such cables. It had reasonable grounds only for ordering
inspections covering high voltage underwater and under-
ground electric cables and material associated with those
cables. The GC therefore annulled the Commission’s in-
spection decisions in both cases.
The GC rejected as inadmissible both parties’ chal-
lenge to the fact that the Commission took away copy
images of documents and hard drives, in order to review
them later at the Commission’s premises. The legality of
that Commission conduct could be examined in the
context of an action challenging any final decision in the
case adopted under Article 101 TFEU, or in an action
for compensation brought against the Commission.
Alternatively, the parties could have generated an early
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challengeable measure by refusing to allow the Commis-
sion to take away the copies in question or to answer
oral questions, thus inducing the Commission to issue a
formal decision imposing fines under Article 23(1) (c)
and (d) of Regulation 1/2003.
Following these judgments, the European Commission
is likely to draft its inspection decisions with increased at-
tention to ensure that the scope of the investigation is
clearly delimited, and only covers areas where it has
grounds to suspect a competition law breach and where it
therefore has a reasonable basis to launch an inspection.
It is regrettable that the GC was not able to rule on the
issue of whether the European Commission can effectively
continue a dawn raid at its premises by copy-imaging
documents for later review with the parties. This is an
area where legal certainty would be very useful. Perhaps
when the administrative procedure in the cables case has
been completed, these points will return to the GC.
B. IT obstruction
On 19 October 2012, the European Commission pub-
lished in the Official Journal a summary of its decision
fining Energeticky a prumyslovy and EP Investment
Advisors a total of E2.5 million for obstructing a dawn
raid.4 The obstruction related to two incidents, both of
which concerned IT. The first incident involved the
failure to block an e-mail account. On the first day of
the raid, the inspectors requested e-mail accounts of key
persons to be blocked until further notice by setting a
new password known only to the inspectors. On the
second day, the inspectors discovered that the password
for one account had been modified in the course of the
first day in order to allow the account holder to access
the account. The second incident involved the diversion
of incoming e-mails. On the third day, the inspectors
discovered that one of the employees had requested the
IT department on the second day to divert all incoming
e-mails to the accounts of several key persons away from
those accounts to a computer server. As a result, the in-
coming e-mails did not become visible in the inboxes
concerned and could not be searched by the inspectors.
C. Right to intervene in actions for annulment
of a cartel decision
In October 2012, the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) published a series of orders it adopted
on 8 June 2012, dismissing appeals by Schenker AG
against the GC’s refusal to grant it permission to inter-
vene in appeals challenging the European Commission’s
decision in the air cargo cartel case.5 The CJEU con-
firmed the GC’s view that the fact that Schenker was a
customer of the cartel members, and intends to bring a
damages action to recover losses that it suffered as
a result of high cartel prices, is not sufficient to give it
a direct and existing interest in the outcome of the an-
nulment proceedings, as required by Article 40 of the
Statute of the CJEU. The CJEU held6 that ‘the mere fact
that an undertaking might possibly be affected by high
prices caused by an alleged cartel does not distinguish it
sufficiently from the other economic operators in the rele-
vant sector which are also affected by the anticompetitive
practices of the members of a cartel. It follows that the
fact that an undertaking is a customer of the undertaking
participating in a cartel is not sufficient, in itself, to es-
tablish the right to intervene’. The Court did, however,
note that active participation in the administrative pro-
cedure may establish an interest in the result of the
case. As a matter of policy, the Court noted that it is
not the purpose of annulment actions brought to chal-
lenge Commission cartel decisions to facilitate the
bringing of civil actions in national courts. It stated
that ‘to recognise that each physical or legal person who
could potentially bring a civil action for damages for loss
resulting from the anti-competitive conduct of an under-
taking has a direct and existing interest in the result of a
case for the purposes of Article 40 . . . would risk seriously
undermining the effectiveness of the procedure before the
Courts of the European Union.’7
This case serves as a reminder of the fact that pro-
spective claimants might want to think about actively
participating in administrative proceedings before the
European Commission to ensure rights of intervention
in any annulment procedure.
D. Interim relief to prevent publication
of leniency information
On 16 November 2012, the GC granted requests from
Akzo Nobel8 and Degussa9 for interim relief in sus-
pending the Commission’s refusal to grant confidential
treatment for information provided in the context of a
leniency application. In 2006, the Commission adopted
a decision in which Akzo Nobel and Degussa, amongst
4 Case COMP/39.793 (OJ (2012) C 316/8).
5 Case C-589/11 P(I) Schenker v Air France and Commission; Case C-590/11
P(I) Schenker v Air France-KLM and Commission; Case C-596/11 P(I)
Schenker v KLM and Commission; Case C-598/11 P(I) Schenker v Cathay
Pacific Airways and Commission; C-600/11 P(I) Schenker v Lan Airlines
and Others; and C-602/11 P(I) Schenker v Deutsche Lufthansa and Others,
orders of 8 June 2012.
6 See Case C-598/11 P(I) Schenker v Cathay Pacific Airways and
Commission, para. 15.
7 See Case C-598/11 P(I) Schenker v Cathay Pacific Airways and
Commission, para. 24.
8 Case T-345/12 R Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission.
9 Case T-341/12 R Evonik Degussa GmbH v Commission.
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others, were fined for participating in a cartel concern-
ing bleaching chemicals. Subsequently, in September
2007, the Commission published a non-confidential
version of that decision on its website. In 2011, however,
the Commission made known its intention to publish
an extended non-confidential version of the 2006 deci-
sion. This extended version would also disclose informa-
tion provided to the Commission on the basis of the
Leniency Notice. This information had not been pub-
lished before for reasons of confidentiality.
The President of the GC concluded that the request
raised complex questions of law relating to the protec-
tion from publication of information provided by leni-
ency applicants, and that the balance of interests was in
favour of granting interim measures to prevent publica-
tion of the contested information pending the conclu-
sion of the annulment proceedings. The President noted
that, during the main proceedings, it will be necessary
to investigate the divergences in the case law in relation
to the assessment of the confidentiality of leniency infor-
mation and how any divergences may be overcome. He
also noted that it would be necessary ‘to examine the
merits of the argument that the applicants’ interest in the
information which they provided as leniency applicants
being kept secret is not deserving of protection, because the
Commission’s leniency programme contains sufficient in-
centive by offering the prospect of a reduced fine, and con-
sequently the Commission has no need to grant any
further advantage to leniency applicants.’10
E. Broken seal case
On 22 November 2012, the CJEU confirmed that E.ON
Energie AG had to pay a fine of E38 million for break-
ing a seal during a dawn raid.11 The CJEU upheld the
GC judgment, in which E.ON’s action against the
Commission’s decision was rejected.
The CJEU concluded that the GC had not unduly
reversed the burden of proof or set aside the principle
of the presumption of innocence. Since the Commission
had determined that there had been a breach of seal
based on a body of evidence, the GC was entitled to
conclude that it was for E.ON to adduce evidence which
challenged that finding.
F. Model leniency programme
On 22 November 2012, the European Competition
Network (ECN) published a new version of its 2006
Model Leniency Programme (MLP).12 The revised MLP
makes clear that all leniency applicants that apply to the
European Commission in cases concerning more than
three Member States may submit a summary applica-
tion to all relevant national competition authorities.
The 2006 MLP had introduced a uniform summary ap-
plication system, but had limited the ability to submit a
summary application to the first applicant only. The
ECN has also published a new template which can be
used for making summary applications.
II. Abuse of dominant position
A. AstraZeneca case
On 6 December 2012, the CJEU handed down the final
chapter in the long-running AstraZeneca case.13 Whilst
the CJEU refrained from establishing a detailed test for
when conduct before a patent office can constitute an
abuse of a dominant position, it confirmed that misuse
of regulatory procedures can in certain circumstances
constitute an abuse of dominance under the EU compe-
tition rules and appeared to rule out the possibility that
simple unintentional mistakes in a patenting process
could be held to be an abuse.
In 2005, the European Commission fined AstraZe-
neca E60 million for abuse of dominance. AstraZeneca
was alleged to have committed two abuses: (i) making
misleading representations before patent offices in order
to obtain supplementary protection certificates, which
extended patent protection for Losec (its anti-ulcer medi-
cine); and (ii) using regulatory procedures (the deregistra-
tion of Losec’s capsule form) to delay the authorisation of
competing generic products.
AstraZeneca appealed the fine and challenged the de-
cision to the GC. In 2010, the GC dismissed most of
AstraZeneca’s arguments, but reduced the overall fine to
E52.5 million on the grounds that the European Commis-
sion had not proved that AstraZeneca’s conduct had pre-
vented parallel imports of Losec to Norway and Denmark.
The CJEU upheld both abuses and the GC’s earlier
judgment in this case.
10 Case T-345/12 R Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission, para. 51. See also,
in a similar situation, another order suspending, on 29 November 2012, a
Commission decision to transmit certain documents to the High Court
of England and Wales that had been submitted to the Commission
during a cartel investigation (although it did not concern leniency
information, only confidential documents unrelated to the cartel): Case T
164/12 R ALSTOM v Commission.
11 Case C-89/11 P E.ON Energie AG v European Commission.
12 See ,http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/documents.html. last
accessed 11 February 2013.
13 Case C-457/10P AstraZeneca v European Commission.
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1. First abuse—misleading statements to the patent
office
AstraZeneca argued that the GC was wrong when asses-
sing whether its representations to the patent offices
were objectively misleading to have dismissed as irrele-
vant the reasonableness of their interpretation of an EU
regulation and their bona fides in that regard. They
argued that this strict interpretation meant that domin-
ant undertakings had to be infallible in their dealings
with regulatory authorities, and that even an error that
was made unintentionally and immediately rectified
could be considered an abuse of dominance.
The CJEU held that the assessment whether repre-
sentations made to public authorities for the purposes
of improperly obtaining exclusive rights are misleading
must be made in concreto and may vary according to
the specific circumstances of each case. The CJEU set
out that there were a number of objective reasons why
AstraZeneca’s conduct was consciously motivated by the
desire to mislead public authorities. The CJEU noted
that if AstraZeneca’s interpretation of the relevant EU
regulation had been reasonable, it should have disclosed
the relevant information which informed its interpret-
ation. Furthermore, it stated that, where a dominant
company has a ‘legally defensible interpretation’ this is
not an excuse which can allow it to make highly mis-
leading representations with the aim of leading public
authorities into error.
The CJEU noted that the GC’s judgment had been con-
fined to the specific circumstances of the case. It stated
that the GC did not hold that a company faces liability
merely for ordinary fallibility or because the subject
matter of a patent application is ultimately found not
to have met the patentability criteria.
2. Second abuse—misuse of regulatory procedures
AstraZeneca argued that its withdrawal of the market
authorisation for Losec was the exercise of a right con-
ferred upon it by EU law, and that the exercise of a right
cannot be both prohibited and granted at the same
time. The CJEU upheld the GC in finding that the use
of a regulatory procedure to exclude competitors in-
fringes Article 102 TFEU, unless it can be shown that
there is a legitimate reason or objective justification for
that regulatory act. The Court held that there was no
objective justification for AstraZeneca to have with-
drawn the market authorisations, that AstraZeneca was
not in any way legitimately protecting an investment
which came within the scope of competition within
the merits, and that the ‘illegality of abusive conduct . . .
is unrelated to its compliance or non-compliance with
other legal rules and, in the majority of cases, abuses of
dominant positions consist of behaviour which is other-
wise lawful under branches of law other than competition
law’.14
III. Mergers
A. Notification and de facto control issues
On 12 December 2012, the GC issued a stark remind-
er of the financial consequences of not notifying
mergers in difficult situations of change of de facto
control.15 The GC fully dismissed Electrabel’s chal-
lenge of a European Commission decision to fine
Electrabel E20 million for acquiring de facto control
over Compagnie Nationale du Rhoˆne (CNR) without
prior approval under the EU Merger Regulation.
In 2003, Electrabel acquired shares in CNR, with a
resulting shareholding of less than 50 per cent. This
transaction was not notified to the European Commis-
sion. In 2008, Electrabel notified its proposal to acquire
the remaining shares in CNR. The transaction was
cleared by the European Commission, but the European
Commission then investigated whether Electrabel had
in fact obtained control over CNR through the 2003
acquisitions so as to trigger a merger notification obli-
gation under the EU Merger Regulation.
In June 2009, the European Commission found that
Electrabel acquired de facto sole control of CNR
through the 2003 acquisitions, and fined Electrabel E20
million for implementing a merger without seeking its
prior approval in breach of the EU Merger Regulation.
The 2003 transactions led Electrabel to increase its
shareholding in CNR from 17.68 per cent of the shares
and 16.88 per cent of the voting rights to 49.95 per cent
of the shares and 47.95 per cent of the voting rights.
Despite the fact that these percentages were less than
50 per cent, the European Commission considered that
Electrabel had acquired de facto sole control of CNR in
2003. The Commission looked at shareholder voting
patterns at CNR’s AGMs, and concluded that Electrabel,
due to the wide dispersion of the remaining shares and
past attendance rates, had consistently obtained an ab-
solute majority enabling it to have resolutions passed
and that this constituted de facto control. This was rein-
forced by other factors, notably the fact that Electrabel
was the sole industrial shareholder of CNR and had
taken over the role previously held by EDF in the oper-
ational management of the power plants and the mar-
keting of the electricity of CNR.
14 See Case C-457/10P AstraZeneca v European Commission, para. 132. 15 Case T-332/09 Electrabel v European Commission.
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The GC dismissed Electrabel’s challenge of the Euro-
pean Commission’s decision. Key findings of the judg-
ment are:
† a minority shareholder must be considered to hold
de facto sole control of an undertaking under the EU
Merger Regulation if the shareholder is virtually
certain of obtaining a majority at future general
meetings because the remaining shareholders are
widely dispersed, and where this could be shown by
attendance at shareholders’ meetings in years prior to
the relevant acquisition. It rejected Electrabel’s argu-
ment that it only acquired de facto sole control in
June 2007 when it was in a position to analyse the
shareholders’ meeting over the past three years and
confirm that it had achieved a consistent majority of
voting rights. This analysis should have applied to
the facts prior to 2003.
† De facto sole control can trigger a filing requirement
in its own right. The GC rejected Electrabel’s argu-
ment that the European Commission had failed to
take into account a French Law (Loi Murcef), which
provided that private companies could not hold
more than 50 per cent of CNR’s share capital and
voting rights. This French law did not prevent Elec-
trabel from acquiring de facto sole control under the
EU Merger Regulation.
† Early implementation of a notifiable transaction
prior to European Commission approval is liable to
bring about significant changes in the competition
situation, and is therefore a serious infringement, and
not a mere formal or procedural infringement.
† The fact that the infringement was committed
through negligence should not give rise to a reduc-
tion in the fine.
† The fact that Electrabel’s acquisition was ultimately
found not to raise any competition issues was not a
decisive factor for determining the gravity of the
infringement.
IV. State aid
A. Latest developments in the commission’s
State aid modernisation programme
On 8 May 2012, the European Commission announced
its plans for modernising the rules and procedures gov-
erning State aid (COM(2012) 209 final). The pro-
gramme promises to be the largest revision of the EU
State aid rules since the Commission launched the State
Aid Action Plan in 2005. The key aims of the Commis-
sion’s modernisation are to: (i) foster growth in a com-
petitive internal market; (ii) focus investigations on
cases with the biggest impact on the internal market;
and (iii) to streamline the rules to enable decisions to be
taken more swiftly.
Besides the revision of most guidelines on compati-
bility assessment and a communication on the notion
of State aid, a core element of the Commission’s mod-
ernisation process consists in amending:
† Council Regulation 994/98 (the ‘Enabling Regula-
tion’), which allows the Commission to adopt Regu-
lations declaring that, subject to specific conditions,
certain categories of aid are compatible with the in-
ternal market, and do not need to be notified to the
Commission; and
† Council Regulation 659/1999 (the ‘Procedural Regu-
lation’), which sets out detailed rules of procedures
governing the enforcement of the State aid rules.
On 5 December 2012, the Commission adopted its pro-
posals for amending both of these Regulations.
With regard to the Enabling Regulation, the Com-
mission is proposing to extend its scope to cover add-
itional categories of aid that the Commission considers
have limited potential to seriously distort competition
or in respect of which the Commission has sufficient
experience to enable it to define clear compatibility
conditions for its inclusion in the general block exemp-
tion regulation. The categories of aid that the Commis-
sion is proposing to include in the Enabling Regulation
include aid granted in favour of: (i) culture and heri-
tage conservation; (ii) making good the damage caused
by natural disasters or adverse weather conditions in
fisheries; (iii) innovation; and (iv) certain broadband
infrastructure.
With regard to the proposal to amend the Procedural
Regulation, the Commission’s main aims seek to
improve: (i) the way in which the Commission handles
complaints that it receives; (ii) ensure that it is able to
gather effective and reliable information from the
market through so-called Market Information Tools
(MIT) and conduct sector enquiries; and (iii) create an
explicit legal basis for dialogues between the Commis-
sion and national courts in situations where the national
court is faced with State aid related issues.
With regard to complaints handling, under the
current Procedural Regulation, the Commission is
obliged to examine all complaints that it receives in
respect of potentially unlawful and/or incompatible aid,
and, if it determines that the complaint is unfounded,
issue a reasoned formal decision rejecting the complaint
(it should be recalled that the Commission has the ex-
clusive competence to decide on the compatibility of
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aid with the internal market; this is a landmark differ-
ence as compared with Article 101(3) TFEU where the
Commission shares the exemption powers with national
competition authorities and national courts; under
State aid rules, national courts intervene only in case of
unlawful aid, that is aid not notified or notified but
implemented before the Commission decides on their
compatibility with the internal market). The Commis-
sion receives on average over 300 complaints each year,
many of which do not raise genuine competition con-
cerns or provide sufficient information substantiating
the complaint. The Commission’s obligation to investi-
gate all complaints reduces its ability to focus on and
prioritise the most important cases.
The Commission, therefore, proposes the introduc-
tion of a standard complaint form that requires com-
plainants to submit certain compulsory information
and demonstrate that it has a ‘legitimate interest’ in
bringing the complaint. If a complainant does not
provide the required information or does not demon-
strate a sufficient interest, its complaint will be deemed
inadmissible (or withdrawn if it fails to respond satisfac-
torily to requests to supplement the information initially
provided) and will not be investigated.
With regard to the Commission’s ability to gather in-
formation effectively, the Commission’s primary source
of information in State aid matters comes directly from
the Member State concerned. In its proposal, the Com-
mission wishes to bring the procedures for requesting in-
formation from third parties into line with those for
antitrust and merger investigations, under which the
Commission can issue information requests and poten-
tially fine recipients if they provide incorrect, incomplete,
or misleading information, or fail to respond within
the prescribed period. The Commission considers that
such new powers would increase its ability to efficiently
gather complete and reliable factual information from
the market.
In addition, the Commission is also proposing to
introduce new provisions enabling it to conduct
sector inquiries where it has reasonable grounds to
believe that State aid measures in a particular sector
or based on a particular instrument may restrict or
distort competition or are no longer compatible with
the internal market.
In light of the need to ensure a consistency of applica-
tion of the State aid rules across the EU, in its proposal
the Commission also seeks to create a formal legal basis
for national courts faced with questions related to State
aid to seek information from the Commission or its
opinion on points concerning the application of State aid
law. If adopted, the proposal would also introduce the
right for the Commission to make submissions to nation-
al courts in written or oral form (in this latter case being
duly authorised by the national court concerned)—as it
is currently able to do in Articles 101–102 TFEU related
cases under Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003.
Overall, the Commission’s proposals, particularly in
respect of the Procedural Regulation are a welcome de-
velopment and will hopefully go some way to addres-
sing the deficiencies of the current system—especially
with regard to the current restrictions on the Commis-
sion’s ability to gather information from the market to
supplement and verify that received from the Member
State concerned. It is unfortunate, however, that the
Commission has not gone further by proposing ways
to encourage further involvement in the process by
both the beneficiary of the aid and any other potential
interested parties—both of whom remain formally
excluded from the Commission’s investigation. The
Commission was, however, realistic as to what was pol-
itically acceptable by the Member States currently.
The Commission’s proposals for revising the Enab-
ling Regulation and Procedural Regulation are currently
being considered by the Council (these are Council regu-
lations) and the European Parliament (for consultation)
and it is hoped that the final texts will be adopted before
the end of 2013.
B. Airport infrastructure construction
On 19 December 2012, the CJEU rejected16 appeals
lodged by Mitteldeutsche Flughafen (MF) and Flughafen
Leipzig-Halle (FLH) against a GC judgment relating to a
Commission decision that a grant of E350 million by
Germany to FLH in the form of capital contributions
for the purposes of funding investments relating to the
construction of a new southern runway constituted State
aid (nevertheless declared compatible with the internal
market).
MF and FLH argued that the construction or exten-
sion of airport infrastructure does not constitute an
economic activity falling within the scope of State aid
rules so that financing it by means of public funds is
not liable to constitute State aid. An important part of
their argument was based on the European Commis-
sion’s 1994 Communication on the application of State
aid rules in the aviation sector, which provides that ‘the
construction or enlargement of infrastructure projects
16 Case C-288/11 P Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle v
Commission.
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(such as airports, motorways, bridges, etc.) represents a
general measure of economic policy which cannot be con-
trolled by the Commission under the Treaty rules on
State aids’. The Court rejected this argument. It held
that a Communication can only be applied if it does
not depart from the proper application of the rules in
the TFEU. The Court noted that the Ae´roport de Paris
case (Case T-238/98) confirmed that an airport oper-
ator is in principle to be regarded as engaging in an
economic activity within the meaning of Article 107(1)
TFEU. It held that, for the purposes of establishing
whether the construction of the new southern railway
could be characterised as an economic activity, the GC
had made an assessment of that activity, and had
found that the construction of the runway could not be
dissociated from the operation by FLH of airport infra-
structure, which constitutes an economic activity.
The Court referred to the constant case law whereby,
in the field of competition law, any activity consisting in
offering goods or services on a given market is an eco-
nomic activity. The fact that an activity is not carried out
by private operators or the fact that it is not profitable
were not relevant criteria for the purposes of whether or
not it was characterised as an economic activity.
Further to this important case, which clearly sets aside
the 1994 Communication as no longer being valid ap-
plicable law, infrastructure construction projects will
no longer escape State aid discipline, provided (i) there
exists an EU market, (ii) the construction falls out of
the exercise of State authority, and (iii) there exists a
sufficient link between the construction and the oper-
ation of the infrastructure.
V. General issues
A. Food sector
On 11 December 2012, the European Commission
announced that it is launching a study to examine choice
and innovation in the retail food sector.17 The study will
examine, in particular, whether increased concentration
and the use of own brand products has hampered choice
and innovation. It will develop a methodology to quan-
tify the delivery of choice and innovation along the food
supply chain. It will also measure the variety of products
available to consumers and the extent of innovation in
products. Further, it will consider whether local retail
concentration has an impact on choice and innovation.
The Commission will issue a call for tenders for expert
researchers to submit proposals for conducting this study
(deadline 14 February 2013). The final report of the
study is expected by the end of 2013.
VI. Looking ahead
A. EUMR simplification
EU Competition Commissioner, Joaquı´n Almunia, indi-
cated in several speeches in 2012 that the Commission is
considering the further simplification of the simplified
merger procedure and the review of its pre-notification
practice. This is a simplification and regulatory burden
initiative to be adopted in 2013 in the Commission’s
2013 Work Programme.
The Commission is also examining the issue of the
acquisitions of non-controlling minority interests. In a
speech in November,18 Mr Almunia stated that there are
two options:
† to propose a selective system in which the Commission
identifies the cases that may raise specific problems; or
† a mandatory notification system of the kind in use
today for mergers involving the acquisition of control.
Mr Almunia stated that the preliminary preference is
for a selective system, which would identify the cases that
prima facie can raise competition problems rather than
creating a system in which significant minority sharehold-
ings would have to be notified in all instances. The Com-
mission will launch a public consultation to discuss the
options.
doi:10.1093/jeclap/lpt003
17 Commission press release IP/12/1356.
18 Commission SPEECH/12/773, Joaquı´n Almunia, Vice President of the
European Commission responsible for Competition Policy, ‘Merger
review: Past evolution and future prospects’, Conference on Competition
Policy, Law and Economics, Cernobbio (Italy), 2 November 2012.
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